arXiv:2607. 27536v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.
arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
arXiv:2608. 07490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents are increasingly evaluated through games, but most benchmarks emphasize final outcomes rather than how players learn from repeated interaction.
arXiv:2608. 12626v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Strategic reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) within long-horizon environments is often limited by inconsistent subgoals.
arXiv:2509. 23102v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences.
arXiv:2607. 01498v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We investigate the problem of learning useful policy representations (embeddings) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games.