Sleight of Word Benchmark: Can Language Models Notice If Their Own Output Was Tampered With?
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arXiv:2608. 20047v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Watermarking schemes for large language model output are evaluated almost exclusively on English text using each scheme's detection threshold and a narrow set of quality measurements.
arXiv:2608. 03803v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multilingual language models are deployed across a hundred or more languages, yet most benchmarks test whether a model can perform a task _in_ a language rather than whether it commands the language itself, conflating fluency with proficiency.
The paper introduces the Adversarial Surface-Form Robustness Dataset (ASRD), which contains 2,100 prompts across seven surface‑form families to test large language models on non‑canonical inputs. Five open‑weight models were evaluated on 10,500 responses, and a Quad‑State Evaluation Rubric categorized each response as harmful compliance, safe response, comprehension failure, or indeterminate. Results show that emoji and invisible Unicode variations produce few comprehension failures, while leetspeak, encoded wrappers, and hybrid transformations lead to high comprehension failure rates and varied harmful compliance percentages.
arXiv:2610.08037v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models frequently generate outputs in unintended languages or scripts, a phenomenon known as off-target generation. While existing research ha...
arXiv:2605. 27901v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring has been proposed as a promising safety mechanism for detecting misaligned behavior in large language models.
arXiv:2608. 11694v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score comes from a single phrasing of each problem.