This study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit different safety vulnerabilities when prompted with emojis instead of plain text. By testing 50 emoji‑augmented prompts on four open‑source LLMs—Mistral 7B, Qwen 2 7B, Gemma 2 9B, and Llama 3 8B—the authors found varying success rates of unsafe responses: Gemma 2 9B and Mistral 7B each had a 10% success rate, Llama 3 8B had 6%, while Qwen 2 7B was fully resistant. A chi‑square test confirmed significant differences in the outcome distributions, suggesting that input representation can markedly affect model robustness.
By M P V S Gopinadh
The paper introduces RiskCueBench, a benchmark designed to separate intent recovery from safety behavior in large language models. It evaluates 25 model groups on 640 prompts covering 160 latent intents across eight risk categories, revealing that higher contextual specificity can reduce refusal rates and safety scores even after intent recovery. The study highlights that safety behavior may be miscalibrated to prompt surface form, underscoring the need for evaluations that condition on semantic recoverability.
By Yuwei Wang, Xingwang Liang, Yu Xie, Haotian Chi, Haijun Geng
arXiv:2606. 28843v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-tuning a large language model is a ubiquitous method for enhancing its capability on a specific downstream task.
By Will Hawkins, Kaivalya Rawal, Jonathan Rystr{\o}m, Stratis Tsirtsis, Zihao Fu, Greta Warren, Ryan Brown, Eoin Delaney, Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, Chris Russell
The paper introduces the ASCII Attack, a single‑turn, black‑box method that embeds a harmful request within ASCII art and presents it as artwork to a large language model. By framing the request as artistic critique, the model can provide operational details that a plain request would normally be refused. Experiments across eleven models and eight harm topics show that the attack succeeds in 62% of cases versus 42% for direct controls, with the most vulnerable model achieving a 93% success rate.
By Da Cheng Gu, Yifei Dong, Xinghao Yang, Yongshun Gong, Wei Liu
arXiv:2608.29589v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Text-to-image (T2I) safety guardrails fail to generalize equitably to non-standard dialects. Evaluating 23,080 paired prompts across five English diale...
By Minkyu Kim, Juhwan Choi, YoungBin Kim
arXiv:2608. 14577v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier large language models (LLMs) safety evaluation has largely treated harmful generation as an attack outcome rather than as an object of analysis.
By Zhouyuan Ma, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang, Xiang Zheng, Xiao Liu, Yixin Cao, Zuxuan Wu, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang