arXiv:2607. 12792v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak-robustness research typically evaluates safety through generated responses using an LLM-as-judge approach.
Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
The paper investigates whether response safety can be measured by the cosine similarity between a response embedding and the mean embedding of known‑safe responses. Using four frozen encoders and prompt‑controlled datasets, the authors find that a simple prototype (mean safe embedding) performs poorly (ROC‑AUC 0.457‑0.545) while an explicit safe‑minus‑unsafe reference achieves higher scores (0.588‑0.738). The study shows that a class mean is merely a location, not a safety direction, and that a reference with sufficient unsafe mass is needed to orient safety judgments.
arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.
arXiv:2607. 00572v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Understanding how aligned LLMs internally represent safety is critical for diagnosing alignment vulnerabilities, as it explains why jailbreaks succeed and informs the design of robust alignment strategies.
arXiv:2607.15218v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as high-level planners for embodied agents, where linguistically benign instructions can become uns...
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.