arXiv:2607. 13039v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for dual-use biology assistants often measure base-model capability, refusal behavior, or jailbreak success.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2607. 22926v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: High-impact generative AI makes catastrophic misuse a lifecycle-control problem, not merely a prompt-filtering problem.
arXiv:2607. 12792v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak-robustness research typically evaluates safety through generated responses using an LLM-as-judge approach.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2606. 00448v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set.
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.