arXiv:2610.15207v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be computationally expensive and vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, in which adversarial prompts bypass...
By Lass Najmuldeen, Seyedhamidreza Mousavi
arXiv:2609.26185v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across many applications but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which elicit ha...
By Doniyorkhon Obidov, Honggang Yu, Xiaolong Guo, Kaichen Yang
arXiv:2606. 11409v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial robustness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) typically report attack success rate (ASR) under fixed query budgets, implicitly treating all attacks as equally costly.
By Malikeh Ehghaghi, Bogl\'arka Ecsedi, Marsha Chechik, Colin Raffel
arXiv:2606. 19755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Speculative inference accelerates large language model (LLM) decoding but provides no inherent safety guarantees.
By Haotian Xu, Zeyang Zhang, Linbao Li, Huadi Zheng, Yu Li, Cheng Zhuo
The paper investigates safety risks in model merging, showing that even when all constituent models are individually safety‑aligned, merging can expose a jailbreak vulnerability rooted in the pretrained foundation model. It introduces Basin‑Aware Jailbreak (BAJ), a min–max optimization method that generates adversarial suffixes transferable across merged models sharing the same backbone, without needing the exact merging coefficients or checkpoints. Experiments demonstrate BAJ’s high transfer success rates across diverse backbones and merging settings, and its resilience against existing defenses.
By Yu Zhe, Yixin Tan, Junhao Wei, Wang Chen
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
By Joshua Adrian Cahyono