arXiv AI By Lass Najmuldeen, Seyedhamidreza Mousavi

Exploring Jailbreak Vulnerability Across Depth-Based Dynamic Inference in Large Language Models

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.

arXiv AI
Jul 23

JailMeter: An Evidence-Based Evaluation Framework for Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models

arXiv:2607. 19424v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The assessment of jailbreak attacks against large language models currently suffers from inconsistent evaluation criteria and methods, leading to unreliable estimates of attack success rates.

By Qingjia Huang, Jingyu Zhang, Jianguo Wu, Yakai Li, Weijuan Zhang, Yankai Rong, Junyi Yao, Shengzhi Zhang, Xiaoqi Jia
arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 9

Safe at One Loop, Risky at Another: Aligning Safety Across Recurrent Depths in Looped Language Models

The paper evaluates the safety of LoopLMs—parameter‑efficient language models that reuse shared parameters across recurrent steps—under jailbreak attacks at various depths. It finds that deeper inference can increase attack success, that safety responses vary across depths, and that attacks transfer between depths, even after standard alignment techniques. To address these gaps, the authors propose SafeBridge, a method that applies depth‑specific control, selective state bridging, and joint safety supervision, which markedly reduces attack success and improves overall utility without increasing over‑refusal.

By Yi Wang, Xiuyuan Qi, Dongqi Han, Dongsheng Li, Wenjie Wang
arXiv AI
Sep 7

AlcaTRAz - Anchored Tree-Rule Defense Against Jailbreaks

AlcaTRAz is a prompt‑level defense that uses rule trees to insert controlled character‑level perturbations into input text, disrupting jailbreak attacks without modifying or retraining the target LLM. It operates solely on the input, making it suitable for black‑box deployments, and was evaluated on 33 open‑weight models and 22 jailbreak types, outperforming three baseline defenses in 73.4 % of model‑attack combinations. While it significantly reduces high‑severity jailbreak success, it does not eliminate it and is intended as one layer of a broader defense strategy.

By Jakub Re\v{s}, Petr Ka\v{s}ka, Martin Pere\v{s}\'ini, Martin Ukrop, Kamil Malinka