For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments?
arXiv:2607. 02255v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Memory for a long-horizon LLM agent is a contract about what each future decision is allowed to see.
By Xiangchen Cheng, Yunwei Jiang, Jianwen Sun, Zizhen Li, Chuanhao Li, Xiangcheng Cao, Yihao Liu, Fanrui Zhang, Li Jin, Kaipeng Zhang
arXiv:2607. 00190v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent advances in reinforcement learning have produced superhuman agents across a wide range of competitive games.
By Andrzej Bia{\l}ecki, Adam Mastalerz, Han Zhou
arXiv:2607. 15854v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coding agents can fix a failing example without preserving the domain rule that made it fail, so later generations can repeat the same plausible mistake.
By Muness Castle, Eric Rubeck
arXiv:2604. 01476v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reinforcement learning for LLMs is vulnerable to reward hacking, where models exploit shortcuts to maximize reward without solving the intended task.
By Rui Wu, Ruixiang Tang
arXiv:2306. 02704v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce \emph{Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs)}, a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework.
By Nika Haghtalab, Chara Podimata, Kunhe Yang