arXiv Computation and Language By Adithiyan Rajan Indira Saravanan, Kathleen C. Fraser

RAG-Safety-Bench: Reliable Evaluation of Retrieval-Augmented LLM Safety

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RAG-Safety-Bench is a benchmark designed to evaluate how retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) affects the safety of large language models (LLMs). It isolates safety impacts by testing four conditions: non-RAG, RAG with an oracle document, RAG with related but non-answer documents, and RAG with random safe documents. Results on five open-source LLMs reveal an inverse relationship between benign and unsafe capabilities, show that baseline safety guardrails do not guarantee safety in RAG, and confirm that even benign documents can trigger unsafe generation.

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