arXiv:2608. 07952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging.
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arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2609.00052v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Commercial LLM APIs advertise a specific foundation model, but the served backbone may be silently substituted, quantized, or wrapped, for example to...
arXiv:2607. 18316v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-augmented language-model agents execute multi-step workflows over external systems, resolving an entity once and then acting on it across subsequent steps.
The paper introduces BSC‑R, a deterministic effect‑boundary mechanism that ties a single‑use commit authorization to the specific action and the semantic state that justified it, aiming to close the proposal‑to‑commit gap in tool‑using language‑model agents. Experiments on 2,847 AgentDojo episodes and 10,302 frozen proposals show that BSC‑R preserves the agent’s original behavior while rejecting unauthorized changes, and further tests on a boundary‑drift experiment and the CONTINUITY suite demonstrate high success rates in valid contexts and robust handling of replay and ambiguous cases. However, broader testing reveals that BSC‑R still allows a 25% invalid‑effect commit rate in a larger attack set, indicating that it provides scoped, not universal, safety.
arXiv:2609.14758v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-augmented language models are evaluated on whether they reach the right answer, not on whether they report honestly when a tool fails to supply...
arXiv:2609.22510v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM applications integrate with external tools, they are increasingly exposed to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where adversarial instructions a...