arXiv AI

DiagChain: A Diagnostic Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Agents on Evidence-Grounded Attack Chain Reconstruction

arXiv:2608. 03591v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents offer a promising approach to attack chain reconstruction by retrieving and interpreting heterogeneous telemetry to infer ordered attacker actions.

arXiv AI
Sep 25

On the Effectiveness of Kernel-Level Evidence for Agent Security

The paper introduces the Agent Cross‑Layer Evidence (ACE) corpus, pairing application‑level telemetry with kernel‑level syscall traces to study agent security. It shows that kernel evidence alone is discriminative and that combining it with application‑level data outperforms either layer alone, revealing complementary signals. The study also demonstrates that this cross‑layer approach generalizes to unseen attack families and works across different agent runtimes.

By Spencer King, Zhilu Zhang, Mikhail Kuznetsov, Kay Liu, Baris Coskun, Wei Ding
arXiv AI
Jul 31

SecRespond: Benchmarking AI Agents for Real-World Post-Compromise Incident Response

arXiv:2607. 26791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities.

By Lehan Wang, Boli Chen, Ruixue Ding, Pengjun Xie, Jinwei Huang, Zhendong Liu, Shuo Wang, Tao Lei, Xin Ouyang, Xiaomeng Li
arXiv AI
3d ago

APTInvestBench: Evaluating Autonomous APT Investigation under Varying Telemetry

APTInvestBench is a benchmark that evaluates how well autonomous agents can investigate advanced persistent threats (APTs) when faced with different telemetry settings. It contains 370 cases derived from 56 attack reconstructions, totaling 16.4 million log records, and tests agents on seven SOC-inspired telemetry conditions. The benchmark measures evidence acquisition and formal citation support, revealing that while overall coverage drops only slightly when telemetry is limited, a significant portion of actions lose sufficient citation support, highlighting instability in agent performance.

By Yu Wang, Shuhao Li, Tao Yin, Ziyang Li, Xueying Zhao, Peishuai Sun, Jiang Xie
arXiv AI
Aug 28

How Do LLM Agents Actually Get the Flag? Trace-Level Provenance for Agentic Offensive Security Evaluation

The paper introduces CTF-ABACUS, a trace-based auditing framework that reconstructs each autonomous language-model agent’s run in Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges into evidence‑grounded solve profiles. By decomposing actions into penetration‑testing phases and techniques, it distinguishes genuine exploitation from shortcut methods such as memorized recall or guessing. Applying the framework to 1,435 CTF attempts by six models on 240 challenges shows that only 62‑87% of recovered flags are trace‑verified, highlighting that many successes rely on shallow trajectories rather than true exploitation.

By Kimberly Milner, Minghao Shao, Nanda Rani, Haoran Xi, Venkata Sai Charan Putrevu, Meet Udeshi, Sandeep K. Shukla, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, Muhammad Shafique, Ramesh Karri
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 4

How Benchmarks and Evaluation Protocols Shape Conclusions in Provenance-Based Intrusion Detection

arXiv:2608. 01454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDS) frequently report strong performance, but the conclusions drawn from these results can be highly sensitive to benchmarking choices and evaluation protocols.

By Lorenzo Guerra, Thomas Chapuis, Guillaume Duc, Pavlo Mozharovskyi, Van-Tam Nguyen