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arXiv AI By Akash Raj, Sargam Sahu

Names Can Hurt: Spotting Slopsquatting Risks Caused by Package Name Hallucinations in Local Coding LLMs

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The paper introduces a two‑layer detector to prevent ‘slopsquatting’—the risk of local coding LLMs fabricating Python package names that adversaries can pre‑register on PyPI. The first layer checks PyPI for existence, while the second uses a Random Forest classifier on ten name‑and‑metadata features; an import reconciler resolves naming mismatches. Embedded in a LangGraph state machine, the system retries at escalating temperatures and falls back to stronger models, achieving hallucination‑free code in 76% of 300 curated prompts and recovering additional runs through intra‑ and cross‑model retries.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

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