The paper introduces a two‑layer detector to prevent ‘slopsquatting’—the risk of local coding LLMs fabricating Python package names that adversaries can pre‑register on PyPI. The first layer checks PyPI for existence, while the second uses a Random Forest classifier on ten name‑and‑metadata features; an import reconciler resolves naming mismatches. Embedded in a LangGraph state machine, the system retries at escalating temperatures and falls back to stronger models, achieving hallucination‑free code in 76% of 300 curated prompts and recovering additional runs through intra‑ and cross‑model retries.
By Akash Raj, Sargam Sahu
arXiv:2605.01047v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Hallucinations remain an unsolved problem for LLMs, and package hallucinations are a particularly dangerous instance of this phenomenon. Pack...
By Joseph Spracklen, Pedram Aghazadeh, Farinaz Koushanfar, Murtuza Jadliwala
The paper introduces the Neutral Prompting Attack (NPA), a stealthy method that uses semantically benign instructions to increase the likelihood of large language models hallucinating non‑existent package names in coding agents. Unlike traditional dependency steering, NPA does not target a specific package but shifts the model’s output toward more speculative names. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that NPA raises hallucination rates, affects pip install success, alters the distribution of hallucinated packages, and bypasses existing static‑analysis, LLM‑based, and agent‑based defenses.
By Chia-Yi Hsu, Chia-Mu Yu, Chun-Ying Huang, Jun Sakuma
SpecCloak investigates how presenting coding tasks as engineering specifications—via the PseudoSpec template—affects large language models’ refusal to generate harmful code. Experiments on five open-weight models show that specification prompting significantly lowers refusal rates even when risk keywords remain, shifting internal representations toward code-output contexts. Building on this, SpecCloak combines PseudoSpec with discriminator-guided optimization to achieve a 28.91% attack success rate, while SpecReveal offers a defense that detects such attacks with 96.88% accuracy without fine‑tuning the target model.
By Wenbin Chen, Jiexin Wang, Guanting Wu, Jiaxi Liang, Yi Cai
arXiv:2606. 03489v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in code generation, they remain prone to replicating subtle yet critical vulnerabilities endemic to their training data.
By Wenqi Chen, Ziyan Zhang, Bing Wang, Lin Liu, Hengheng Zhang, Zhengsu Chen
arXiv:2606. 16244v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models routinely generate code with exploitable security flaws.
By Xiaoyun Xu, Lichao Wu, Jona te Lintelo, Siyu Zhang, Stjepan Picek