arXiv AI By Zhipeng Wei, Michael Lee, N. Benjamin Erichson

Multiple Turns, Short Horizons: Measuring Effective-Horizon Compression in Jailbreaks

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The paper investigates how much of a multi-turn jailbreak attack’s query history is necessary to achieve the same progress. By removing early attacker queries and re-running the remaining sequence, the authors define the effective horizon as the shortest query set that reproduces the attack outcome. They find that, on average, about half of the original queries suffice, a phenomenon they term effective-horizon compression, and demonstrate that this shorter history can improve attack continuation, training efficiency, and maintain defense calibration.

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