arXiv AI
Sep 7

AlcaTRAz - Anchored Tree-Rule Defense Against Jailbreaks

AlcaTRAz is a prompt‑level defense that uses rule trees to insert controlled character‑level perturbations into input text, disrupting jailbreak attacks without modifying or retraining the target LLM. It operates solely on the input, making it suitable for black‑box deployments, and was evaluated on 33 open‑weight models and 22 jailbreak types, outperforming three baseline defenses in 73.4 % of model‑attack combinations. While it significantly reduces high‑severity jailbreak success, it does not eliminate it and is intended as one layer of a broader defense strategy.

By Jakub Re\v{s}, Petr Ka\v{s}ka, Martin Pere\v{s}\'ini, Martin Ukrop, Kamil Malinka
arXiv AI
Aug 19

Fair ASR: Re-Evaluating Black-Box Jailbreaks under Shared Target-Call Budgets

The paper introduces Fair-ASR, a protocol for evaluating black‑box jailbreak attacks using a shared target‑call budget, addressing the bias of prior studies that rely solely on attack success rate. Re‑evaluating 11 attacks under this protocol shows significant shifts in rankings and highlights that many methods are not efficient in both target and attacker calls. The authors then present ReCode, a budget‑efficient attack that combines desensitization rewriting with low‑cost primitives, achieving 85% ASR on GPT‑5 with only 7.19 attacker calls per request under a 20‑target‑call budget.

By Zhida He, Xiaoyu Wen, Han Qi, Ziyuan Zhou, Peng Yu, Jiajia Li, Chaochao Lu, Qiaosheng Zhang