arXiv AI By Advait Yadav, Sid Black, Oliver Sourbut

More Capable, Less Cooperative? When LLMs Fail At Zero-Cost Collaboration

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arXiv:2604. 07821v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly coordinate in multi-agent systems, yet we lack an understanding of where and why cooperation fails.

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arXiv AI
Jun 2

Scaling Behavior of Single LLM-Driven Multi-Agent Systems

arXiv:2606. 00655v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The burgeoning field of LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) promises to tackle complex tasks through collaborative intelligence, yet fundamental questions regarding their scaling behavior and intrinsic collective dynamics remain underexplored.

By Jialing Li, Zhouhong Gu, Yin Cai, Hongwei Feng
arXiv AI
Aug 11

The Collaboration Gap: Exploration and Benchmarking of Open-World Agentic Cooperation

arXiv:2511. 02687v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The trajectory of AI development suggests that we will increasingly rely on agent-based systems powered by language models, composed of independently developed agents with different information, privileges, and tools.

By Tim R. Davidson, Adam Fourney, Saleema Amershi, Robert West, Eric Horvitz, Ece Kamar
arXiv AI
Jun 9

Benchmarking Open-Ended Multi-Agent Coordination in Language Agents

arXiv:2606. 08340v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, they must coordinate with others over long horizons in open-ended interactive tasks.

By Kale-ab Abebe Tessera, Andras Szecsenyi, Cameron Barker, Alexander Rutherford, Davide Paglieri, Aidan Scannell, Henry Gouk, Elliot J. Crowley, Tim Rockt\"aschel, Amos Storkey
arXiv AI
Jul 7

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.

By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin