arXiv AI By Songping Wang, Peiyang Li, Yi Huang, Fengting Li, Xuhao Ran, Yueming Lyu, Chao Feng, Caifeng Shan

MobileInject: Evaluating Reasoning-to-Action Security of MLLM-Based Mobile Agents under Cross-Modal Consistency Injection

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MobileInject is a benchmark that evaluates the security of multimodal large language model (MLLM)-based mobile agents against multimodal injection attacks. It offers a high‑fidelity interactive framework with 11 scenarios, 9 risk categories, and 108 executable risk instances, and introduces Cross‑Modal Consistency Injection along with two advanced attack methods—Multi‑Role Collaborative Deception and Reasoning‑Camouflage Injection—to intensify trust manipulation and reasoning hijacking. Experiments show that mobile agents are broadly vulnerable, especially to early‑stage reasoning hijacking, establishing MobileInject as a systematic tool for studying and improving mobile agent security.

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