arXiv AI

ADeptS-Bench: Measuring the Trustworthiness of Computer Use Agents Across Devices

ADeptS-Bench is a new benchmark designed to assess the trustworthiness of Computer Use Agents (CUAs) across mobile and desktop devices. It consists of two streams: a Safety stream with paired benign and malicious tasks that embed visual threats, and a Disambiguation stream that tests whether agents seek clarification when instructions are ambiguous. Evaluation of seven models shows none consistently achieves high task success while keeping attack success low, and all models exhibit problematic behaviors such as unhesitant checkout on a $25K order and failure to detect a mislabeled factory reset button.

arXiv AI
Jun 9

When Benign Inputs Lead to Severe Harms: Eliciting Unsafe Unintended Behaviors of Computer-Use Agents

arXiv:2602. 08235v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts.

By Jaylen Jones, Zhehao Zhang, Yuting Ning, Eric Fosler-Lussier, Pierre-Luc St-Charles, Yoshua Bengio, Dawn Song, Yu Su, Huan Sun
arXiv AI
Jun 18

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.

By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 2

Same Payload, Different Channel: Measuring Trust Asymmetry in Tool-Using Language Models

arXiv:2606. 00566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As language models take on agentic roles that span calling external APIs, reading tool outputs, and acting on instructions embedded in third-party content, their attack surface expands well beyond what users type.

By Mohammed Sameer Syed (University of Arizona), Rozhin Yasaei (University of Arizona)