The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
By Arno Libert, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Daan R. Henselmans
arXiv:2604. 24155v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The project of aligning machine behavior with human values raises a basic problem: whose moral expectations should guide AI decision-making?
By Benjamin Minhao Chen, Xinyu Xie
arXiv:2607. 00002v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Moral cognition has traditionally been modeled as adherence to fixed ethical theories--deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics--implemented as static rules or value functions.
By Max Kanwal, Caryn Tran, Patrick Mineault
arXiv:2608. 10327v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Can AI systems be aligned to human values?
By Andrew Smart, Shazeda Ahmed, Jackie Kay, Jimmy Tobin, Kris Shrishak, Abeba Birhane
The paper proposes a developmental framework for autonomous artificial agents that emphasizes learning social norms and alignment through direct interaction with dynamic environments. It argues that intrinsic motivations such as curiosity and competence can guide exploration, but also complicate alignment with human goals. By drawing parallels to child development, the authors suggest that regulatory sandboxes serve as pedagogical spaces where agents gradually acquire moral agency and adapt their behaviors through experience and cooperation.
By Marica Notte, Ludovica Marinucci, Vieri Giuliano Santucci
The paper examines how the rise of AI capable of moral reasoning could reshape meta-ethics, traditionally focused on human ethics. It proposes a framework that identifies new questions about AI’s own ethics from both human and AI perspectives, dividing them into four domains. The author explores how existing meta-ethical theories might apply to these domains and argues that many human-centered formulations will need significant revision to accommodate AI.
By Shang Lu