arXiv:2607. 11707v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Following the rapid progress of generative Artificial Intelligence, there is a growing threat posed by conversational scams.
By Ahmed Omar Salim Adnan, Yogananda Manjunath, Shivanjali Khare
arXiv:2607. 18496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for a range of software, hardware and human-centered security tasks.
By Shufan Chai, Liangliang Sun, Jessica Staddon
arXiv:2607. 17586v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Money mule accounts are critical facilitators of financial fraud, yet detecting them at scale remains challenging due to the heterogeneous nature of transactional and behavioural data.
By Yuge Zhang, Yuanxing Zhang, Yichao Jin, Khairul Amsyar Mohd Razis, Nicholas Qi An Choo, Kai Yin Anders Wong, Xinyan Tang, Kenneth Zhu Ke, Wee Keong Dennis Lee, Jingyuan Zhao
arXiv:2608. 10239v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Generative AI makes social-engineering attacks more fluent, adaptive, and scalable, increasing the need for LLM-based de- fenders that can protect users during ongoing interactions.
By Yuqiao Xu, Osama Zafar, Alexander Nemecek, Erman Ayday
The study analyzes 10,211 real scam and spam calls collected by an AI voice‑agent honeypot, revealing that scammers operate on a templated, office‑hour schedule and use disposable numbers to recycle scripts. Callers predominantly seek identity anchors such as home addresses and dates of birth, and the amount of conversation increases with the target’s age, though the requested information remains unchanged. Early detection is feasible, with escalation predictability reaching 0.87 ROC‑AUC by the eighth line using simple bag‑of‑words models.
By Ethan Traister, Ankit Raj, Jiaqi Gan, Xingyu Shen, Tyler Wu, Yuchen Zhou, Tommy Duong, Kidus Zewde, Siying Chen, Simiao Ren
TeleAntiFraud 2.0 is a monthly‑frozen, audio‑based benchmark for telecom fraud detection that incorporates newly observed scam patterns while preserving earlier test sets. It uses a Mixed‑Tree Anti‑Fraud Generation Pipeline to create profile‑grounded scenarios, expands them into mixed‑tree dialogues, and renders validated speech for 900 Chinese calls (600 fraud, 300 near‑domain non‑fraud) each month. Experiments show that classifiers perform well against unrelated negatives but drop significantly against near‑domain negatives, highlighting the need for near‑domain construction and collapse‑aware reporting in realistic evaluation settings.
By Huiyuan Liu, Zhiming Ma, Yanxing Liu, Shun Zhang, Qifan Wang, Di Liu, Yifan Wang, Yuyang Deng, Haoyang Meng, Yijin Zhou, Yuxi Zhao, Chengxian Hu, Peidong Wang, Peng Chen