HiveTraceGuard-Pro: A Compact Generative Guardrail for Prompt Injection, Jailbreaks, and Adversarial Obfuscation
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
Production LLMs must handle inputs that attempt to override system instructions, bypass safety policies or elicit harmful responses. A common mitigation is a separate guardrail model. Existing reports...
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