arXiv Machine Learning By Subrat Kishore Dutta, Yuelin Xu, Piyush Pant, Xiao Zhang

GREAT: Generalizable Backdoor Attacks in RLHF via Emotion-Aware Trigger Synthesis

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

arXiv:2510. 09260v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent work has shown that RLHF is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks.

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