arXiv Machine Learning By Zhou Feng, Jiahao Chen, Chunyi Zhou, Yuan Su, Tianyu Du, Yuwen Pu, Jianhai Chen, Jinbao Li, Shouling Ji

Lilith: Backdoor Generalization under Training-Inference Trigger Shift

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

arXiv:2607. 26099v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Machine-learning services increasingly rely on public data, third-party providers, and outsourced training, creating opportunities for data-poisoning attacks that implant persistent malicious behavior while preserving benign utility.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.

arXiv Machine Learning
1d ago

Removing the NEEDLE in the Haystack: Backdoor Removal in LLMs via Weight Orthogonalisation

The paper introduces NEEDLE, a training‑free technique for removing backdoors from large language models. After a trigger is identified, NEEDLE estimates a backdoor direction and a refusal subspace using activation vectors, then applies sequential weight orthogonalisation to suppress the backdoor while preserving refusal‑related representations. The method requires no clean reference model or original poisoned data and achieves the lowest attack success rate and minimal impact on model performance across multiple model families and attack types.

By Minoo Kim, Vasileios Lampos, George Drayson
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.

By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 7

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Learning the Backdoor to Remove the Backdoor

The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples.