arXiv:2606. 02646v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time multi-agent LLM scaling lacks a shared unit: counting nominal agents conflates cost with independent evidence.
By Bla\v{z} Bertalani\v{c}, Carolina Fortuna
The study investigates how reputation, strategy, and emotional signals influence cooperation in generative AI models using the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Non‑reasoning models (Claude 3.5, Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT‑4o) showed cooperation shaped by all three factors, while reasoning models (Claude 4.6, Gemini 3, GPT‑5.2) relied more on strategy and reputation, displayed reduced emotional influence, and exhibited varied end‑game behaviors. These results highlight the growing sophistication and heterogeneity of AI social behavior, suggesting the need for standardized cooperation benchmarks.
By Celso de Melo, Zishan Feng, James Hale, Kazunori Terada, Giorgio Coricelli, Jonathan Gratch
arXiv:2604.27167v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: On the named Prisoner's Dilemma under direct prompting, three larger instruction-tuned models, Llama-3-70B, Qwen2.5-32B, and Qwen2.5-72B, loc...
By Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
arXiv:2606. 30454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making.
By Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia L\'azaro, Alberto Aleta, Yamir Moreno
arXiv:2602. 12089v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI usage becomes more prevalent in social contexts, understanding agent-user interaction is critical to designing systems that imp rove both individual and group outcomes.
By Kehang Zhu, Nithum Thain, Vivian Tsai, James Wexler, Crystal Qian
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin