arXiv:2607. 01919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory.
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arXiv:2607. 14611v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases.
arXiv:2606. 04425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts.
arXiv:2606. 12797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising.
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.
AgentKernel proposes a trust‑native operating system for AI agents, arguing that current governance layers are insufficient because they share the same process trust boundary as the agents. The OS introduces a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars—Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution—each adapting classical OS security principles to address semantic‑level failures such as prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. By wrapping the agent lifecycle in this structured, non‑bypassable framework, AgentKernel aims to provide a unified security layer that can enforce identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control across the entire agent lifecycle.
Sapien is a policy engine that enforces stateful contextual policies for autonomous AI agents, specifying allowed tool‑call sequences with an extended regular expression that includes stateful predicates, deferred policy generation, and scoped semantic checks. The system maintains performance close to an unconstrained agent while significantly reducing malicious actions, ruling out 93‑95% of attacks on AgentDojo and 62‑85% on Toolathlon, outperforming traditional tool allowlists on long‑horizon tasks.