arXiv:2608. 16334v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Keystroke dynamics (typing patterns) can be used as a behavioural biometric modality for user authentication, with applications such as fraud prevention.
By Nuwan Kaluarachchi, Sevvandi Kandanaarachchi, Kristen Moore, Arathi Arakala, Conrad Sanderson
The paper introduces BIND, a framework that binds a human’s biometric data to an AI agent’s identity and task-specific authority, enabling secure, real‑time delegation of control. By generating a token that an AI agent presents to an Identity Auditor, the system performs biometric authentication and recovers the agent’s ID and scope, providing non‑repudiable proof of human oversight. A practical implementation using face features and a fuzzy commitment scheme with turbo error‑correcting codes achieves a 96% true match rate at zero false match rate and supports 1024‑bit agent tokens.
By Joseph Geo Benjamin, Anil K Jain, Karthik Nandakumar
arXiv:2608.20884v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Face recognition systems (FRSs) are increasingly deployed in critical real-world services for authentication, such as banking applications and airport...
By Changjin Kim, Seunghun Paik, Dongsoo Kim, Jae Hong Seo
arXiv:2606. 31272v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly acquire and execute skills at runtime: bundles of prompt instructions, executable code, and tool declarations fetched from marketplaces and other agents.
By Hongliang Liu, Yuhao Wu, Tung-Ling Li
arXiv:2606. 21900v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Continuous authentication for mobile and zero-trust systems requires nonintrusive evidence confirming the enrolled user-device context remains valid after initial login.
By Stergios Lantzos, Ilias Syrigos, Apostolos Apostolaras, Thanasis Korakis
RouteScan is a non‑intrusive auditing framework that detects harmful behavior in Mixture‑of‑Experts (MoE) large language models by analyzing expert‑routing telemetry captured from GPU execution. It uses the number of active GPU threads during the prefilling phase as a micro‑architectural fingerprint to isolate cross‑domain risk indicators and precisely identify malicious prompts. Evaluations on four open‑source MoE LLMs show strong generalization with AUROC > 0.91 on unseen harmful domains, while privacy tests indicate that full prompts cannot be reliably recovered from aggregated telemetry.
By Bo Lv, Zhiheng Xu, KeDong Xiu, Ruyi Ding, Tianhang Zheng, Zhibo Wang, Kui Ren