arXiv AI By Ajay Pravin Mahale (Hochschule Trier)

Causal Attribution for Agentic Decisions: Estimators, Coupling, and a Traceability Specification

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The paper presents a framework for causal attribution in agentic AI systems, outlining estimators and conditions where they fail. It distinguishes between marginal total effects and common‑random‑number total effects, introduces a natural direct effect under pinned downstreams, and derives a coupling method to keep direct effects estimable. The authors also propose a traceability specification to meet upcoming regulatory requirements for high‑risk AI systems.

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