arXiv Computer Vision By Xiaocheng Zou, Tiancheng Zheng, Xiaolin Xu, Ruyi Ding

Capacity Overflow: A Blind Spot for Backdoor Attacks in Vision MoE

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The paper exposes a hidden vulnerability in Vision Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models that use capacity-bounded token dispatch, which varies with batch size. It presents a three-phase backdoor attack: injecting a backdoor into an early MoE layer, training a neutralizer in a deeper layer to suppress it under normal capacity, and then adjusting the batch-adaptive capacity factor so that the neutralizer is disabled when large batches are used at deployment. Experiments on V-MoE and Swin-MoE show high attack success rates (76‑87%) for large batches while keeping the attack dormant and undetected during small-batch audits, evading several state‑of‑the‑art defenses.

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