The paper introduces Audience‑Bound Persistent Memory, a system that tracks the audience of each memory item and enforces authorization throughout the memory lifecycle. Each item carries the audience present at recording, and derived items are partitioned or suppressed based on the intersection of source audiences, expanding only through explicit grants. The authors implement the approach in two reference architectures—a flat store and a relationship graph—and evaluate it on 10,000 multi‑party histories, showing that no forbidden items entered any context while unscoped retrieval exposed forbidden items in 82% of cases, and that entitled recall matched policy‑equivalent baselines and outperformed unscoped retrieval by 0.30 Recall@5.
By Sibo Liu
arXiv:2606. 26627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf.
By Nada Lahjouji, Ashwin Gerard Colaco
arXiv:2606. 15609v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory to support complex task execution, user personalization, and domain adaptation.
By Zixin Rao, Wentian Zhu, Chan Aristella Lu, Zhaorun Chen, Wei Niu, Le Guan, Bo Li, Zhen Xiang
arXiv:2607. 06595v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents powered by large language models can reason and act using available tools to access emails, manage calendars, and push code to remote repositories, all with minimal oversight.
By George Torres, Sharad Shrestha, Satyajayant Misra
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream.
The paper investigates privacy risks in agentic AI systems that assemble sensitive data into a hidden context before responding. It introduces context‑inference attacks, a security game that evaluates how well attackers can recover this hidden context under varying levels of knowledge and indirect delivery. Experiments show that even with controls such as instructions not to disclose, logit suppression, and context dilution, agents can leak significant contextual information, achieving high success rates across multiple attack settings.
By Prince Jha, Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas