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arXiv AI By Liang Yuan, Xiaohu Du, Ruikun Luo, Jinze Wang, Mashud Rana, Kaibin Wang, Jiangwen Zhou, Bo Li, Xiaoyu Xia

Answer-Only Disclosure: Private-Context LLM Assistance over Web APIs with a Leakage Ledger

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The paper introduces ADLER, a decoding protocol that limits private-context LLM assistance over Web APIs to only public views and the final answer, preventing leakage of private content through message transcripts. A client-side leakage ledger tracks how much the answer reveals relative to a public reference process, ensuring that no configuration exposes hidden secrets. Experiments on GSM8K math problems show that ADLER can significantly improve accuracy compared to zero-leakage baselines while keeping disclosure within a controlled budget.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

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