arXiv Machine Learning By Georgios Politis, Evangelos Pappas

Privacy Failure in Split-LLM Training, The Returned Gradient Nullifies the Decoys

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The paper reports a privacy breach in a two-node split‑LLM training system where the returned gradient reveals which data rows were real, despite the system passing standard privacy checks. By exploiting the fact that decoy rows produce zero gradients, an attacker can identify real rows with 100% accuracy across multiple runs. The authors demonstrate that adding gradient clipping and noise can mitigate the leak, but the system remains vulnerable to several untested attack vectors.

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arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 16

Federated Art Chase: Privacy Leakage and Data Poisoning in Federated Fine-Tuning

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By Halil \.Ibrahim Kanpak, Sinem Sav, Alptekin K\"up\c{c}\"u