AlignPoison: Conditional Targeted Poisoning of Generative Recommenders via Decoding-Aligned Prefixes
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
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The paper introduces VirusCascade, a black‑box attack that exploits the collaborative reflection mechanism in LLM‑powered recommender agents. By leveraging reflective persistence and cross‑agent propagation, the attack promotes a target item through semantic rationalisation and structural positioning, achieving state‑of‑the‑art targeted exposure on four real‑world datasets. The study demonstrates that existing static‑pipeline attacks cannot exploit this recurrent, multi‑agent amplification pathway.
arXiv:2606. 02643v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-enhanced LLM systems, while powerful, introduce substantial inference costs due to the inclusion of an extra multi-stage pipeline that dynamically retrieves and synthesizes information from external knowledge sources.
arXiv:2606. 11265v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection.
arXiv:2512. 05518v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) play a critical role in the democratization of AI, yet their "open" nature introduces more avenues for malicious actors to misuse them for harmful purposes.
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