arXiv AI By Jakub Seredy\'nski, Georgios Tsaousoglou

AI agents in Algorithmic Electricity Markets: On the Emergence of Tacit Collusion

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The paper examines whether autonomous learning-based agents in electricity markets can develop tacit collusion without explicit coordination. By modeling strategic bidding as a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring and employing multi-agent reinforcement learning, the authors identify conditions under which agents achieve supra-competitive outcomes. Their experiments demonstrate that such collusive behavior can emerge naturally, highlighting a realistic risk for algorithmic electricity markets.

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