arXiv:2606. 01416v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents rely on orchestration layers that coordinate planning, retrieval, tool invocation, validation, memory, and recovery.
By Rahul Suresh Babu, Adarsh Agrawal
arXiv:2608. 14863v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based coding agents have advanced rapidly on single-process SWE tasks, with frontier models now clustering in the high-70s on SWE-bench Verified.
By Yibo Yan, Huijuan Wang, Junzhou He, Yizhuo Liang, Shaoyu Wang, Huanchen Sun, Seo Jin Park
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
By Atul Anand, Sourav Chattaraj
arXiv:2605. 27898v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents, reliable assessment of their agentic capabilities has become essential.
By Pengyu Zhu, Lijun Li, Yaxing Lyu, Qianxin Luo, Jingyi Yang, Yi Liu, Tingfeng Hui, Xinyu Yuan, Li Sun, Sen Su, Jing Shao
arXiv:2512. 16310v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents increasingly use multiple external tools to complete complex tasks.
By Yuxuan Qiao, Dongqin Liu, Hongchang Yang, Wei Zhou, Songlin Hu
Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why. We introduce canary tools: diagnostic probe tools planted in an agent's Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool set, each engineered to probe one specific tool-selection weakness.
arXiv:2606. 15508v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-augmented large language model agents increasingly operate over large tool libraries, but existing evaluations often focus on whether a model can call a tool correctly rather than how the visible tool menu shapes reliability, efficiency, and safety-relevant risk exposure.
By Rahul Suresh Babu, Laxmipriya Ganesh Iyer
arXiv:2608. 05263v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent orchestration frameworks are moving from demos to production, yet benchmarks typically report task accuracy without diagnosing why a pipeline failed, where a cascade began, or which routing decision caused the breakdown.
By Yidian Chen, Yingzi Gu, Natan Vidra, Spurthi Setty, Sharon Zheng
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang
arXiv:2607. 05775v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly evaluated on their ability to use tools, plan multi-step tasks, coordinate with other agents, and operate over extended horizons.
By Wael Albayaydh, Rui Zhao, Ivan Flechais
arXiv:2606. 05806v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing benchmarks evaluate Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) in LLMs on idealized ''happy paths'', largely overlooking real-world tool failures.
By Dongsheng Zhu, Xuchen Ma, Yucheng Shen, Xiang Li, Yukun Zhao, Shuaiqiang Wang, Lingyong Yan, Dawei Yin
arXiv:2607. 20531v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed over Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, yet the benchmarks used to evaluate them score the final answer or a fixed "ground-truth" list of tools, both of which are fragile once the underlying data is live and stateful.
By Jerzy Kami\'nski, Ilya Galyukshev, Artem Kuznetsov, Sergey Chuprin, Kirill Redko, Aidar Shumbalov, Anna Kalyuzhnaya