arXiv AI By Rahul Kumar Yadav, Tunir Ghosh, Sudhendu Ahir, Parthe Pandit, Arjun Bhagoji

Adversarial Robustness of Kernel Machines: A Comprehensive Analysis

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The paper investigates how resilient kernel-based models are to adversarial attacks. It conducts extensive experiments on binary and multiclass classification tasks, using both white-box and black-box evasion techniques, and compares native kernel machines, random feature classifiers, and Recursive Feature Machines. The study also introduces an algorithm for approximate adversarial training of kernel machines and finds that these models degrade more gracefully than neural networks when faced with adversarial perturbations.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 26

Over-parameterization and Adversarial Robustness in Neural Networks: An Overview and Empirical Analysis

arXiv:2406. 10090v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Thanks to their extensive capacity, over-parameterized neural networks exhibit superior predictive capabilities and generalization.

By Srishti Gupta, Zhang Chen, Luca Demetrio, Fabio Brau, Xiaoyi Feng, Zhaoqiang Xia, Antonio Emanuele Cin\`a, Maura Pintor, Luca Oneto, Ambra Demontis, Battista Biggio, Fabio Roli
OpenAI Blog
Aug 22, 2019

Testing robustness against unforeseen adversaries

We’ve developed a method to assess whether a neural network classifier can reliably defend against adversarial attacks not seen during training. Our method yields a new metric, UAR (Unforeseen Attack Robustness), which evaluates the robustness of a single model against an unanticipated attack, and highlights the need to measure performance across a more diverse range of unforeseen attacks.

arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 28

Attack logics, not outputs: Concept-based Property Attacks for Shortcut Elimination in Neural Networks

The paper introduces concept-based property attacks, which target logical inconsistencies in human‑interpretable concepts (e.g., “red ∧ octagonal → stop_sign”) rather than merely flipping final class labels. It formalizes these properties, proves that attacking them reduces the search space compared to class‑level attacks, and implements them using concept‑based explainable AI techniques. Empirical results across vision and code‑processing models show that retraining with these attacks preserves robustness gains while better eliminating semantic biases.

By Raik Dankworth, Felix M\"achtle, Thomas Eisenbarth, Gesina Schwalbe