arXiv:2606. 24589v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real.
By Khanak Khandelwal (Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur)
arXiv:2608. 08700v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reliable evaluation of tool routing is critical as Large Language Models increasingly operate as autonomous agents.
By Dongjie Xu, Julius, Hanchi Dong, Minghua Tang, Yuxuan Sun, Ziwei Nie, Zicheng Liu, Dujun Qing, Jiajie Xu
The paper introduces the SAST-IR framework to evaluate large language models’ robustness against persuasion attacks in a memory‑less setting, revealing a flaw called "Refusal Inertia" that masks true vulnerability. Using the CP‑Agent and a custom CounterFact‑Strict dataset, the authors demonstrate that simple, diverse attack strategies achieve a 96% success rate, while complex attacks often trigger defensive compliance. The study highlights severe brittleness in current state‑of‑the‑art models when deprived of conversation history.
By Zhuoang Cai
arXiv:2607. 28802v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing evaluations often reduce agent failures to system-level outcomes, obscuring where the fault originated and which intervention would improve the agent system.
By Harsh Raj, Vipul Gupta, Anas Mahmoud, Razvan-Gabriel Dumitru, Darvin Yi, Aakash Sabharwal, Yunzhong He
arXiv:2508. 00923v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to answer health-related questions and support healthcare workflows, yet evidence for their safety still relies heavily on static benchmarks that can rapidly become obsolete or be optimized against.
By Jiazhen Pan (Cherise), Bailiang Jian (Cherise), Paul Hager (Cherise), Yundi Zhang (Cherise), Che Liu (Cherise), Friederike Jungmann (Cherise), Hongwei Bran Li (Cherise), Julian Canisius (Cherise), Chenyu You (Cherise), Junde Wu (Cherise), Jiayuan Zhu (Cherise), Fenglin Liu (Cherise), Yuyuan Liu (Cherise), Niklas Bubeck (Cherise), Moritz Knolle (Cherise), Chen (Cherise), Chen (Cherise), Christian Wachinger, Zhenyu Gong, Cheng Ouyang, Georgios Kaissis, Benedikt Wiestler, Daniel Rueckert
The paper introduces a counterfactually anchored evidence attribution approach for multi‑turn large language model safety failures. It presents a new dataset of 1,762 conversations, including adversarial, benign twins, and high‑risk vocabulary variants, and trains a lightweight hierarchical model that accurately predicts safety violations and attributes them to specific user turns and token spans. The model achieves high detection performance (F1 = 0.988) and significantly reduces adversarial confidence when top‑attributed tokens are removed, while maintaining low false‑positive rates on benign conversations.
By Srinivasan Subramanian, Kazi Aminul Islam, Md. Abdullah Al Hafiz Khan
The paper introduces an action‑class diagnostic framework for multi‑turn tool‑calling in large language model agents, breaking failures into action‑class miscalibration and action‑execution failure across a four‑class action space (TOOL_CALL, ASK, REFUSE, CONFIRM). It defines a self‑revealing upper bound (Acc GAR) to expose state‑grader masking of miscalibration and shows that miscalibration is a significant, previously hidden failure mode, especially for heavily tool‑trained families. The study demonstrates that calibration can be reshaped by context‑only perturbations, but the effects vary widely across models and perturbation mechanisms, underscoring the need for diagnostics beyond aggregate accuracy.
By Kangjia Zhao, Jiajun Li, Haozhan Shen, Wei Chow, Linfeng Li, Hang Song, Lingdong Kong, Chen Zhi, Tiancheng Zhao, Songhua Liu, Jianwei Yin
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley
The paper introduces Continual Search, an iterative framework that guides large language models to persistently search for diagnostic evidence in long AI agent execution logs, addressing the limitations of one-shot judgments. Evaluated on four existing RCA benchmarks and a new large-scale dataset called MegaRCA-Mix, Continual Search consistently boosts attribution performance, achieving a 40% F1 improvement for GPT‑5.5 on MegaRCA‑Mix. The results show that effective search can outweigh raw model scale, enabling lower-tier models to outperform higher-tier ones in root‑cause attribution tasks.
By Harsh Raj, David Lee, Anas Mahmoud, Renxiong Wang, Razvan-Gabriel Dumitru, Chenguang Wang, Tong Zhao, Yunzhong He, Darvin Yi, Vipul Gupta
arXiv:2607. 19361v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Most safety guardrails for large language models (LLMs) evaluate each prompt-response pair in isolation, which misses failures that arise only over a dialogue as benign turns compose into harm.
By Sanjay Mishra, Divya Chukkapalli, Ganesh R. Naik
arXiv:2607. 16387v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agent system's execution traces record how it fails, and procedures that improve such a system without changing model weights (trajectory selection, prompt and workflow optimization, runtime monitoring) read these traces for feedback.
By Mert Cemri, Andrei Cojocaru, Melissa Pan, Shu Liu, Shubham Agarwal, Alexander Krentsel, Jay Tang, Kannan Ramchandran, Joseph E. Gonzalez, Matei Zaharia, Alex Dimakis, Ion Stoica
arXiv:2607. 01153v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task.
By Brett Reynolds