DeepMind Blog

Advancing Private AI Compute with secure, server-side memory

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DeepMind introduces private, server‑side memory to its Private AI Compute platform, enabling personal AI applications to operate with secure, isolated memory on the server side. This enhancement focuses on protecting user data while allowing AI models to run efficiently in a private environment. The update expands the capabilities of Private AI Compute by adding a new layer of security and privacy for personal AI use cases.

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OpenAI Blog
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