arXiv AI

Seeing Is No Longer Believing: Frontier Image Generation Models, Synthetic Visual Evidence, and Real-World Risk

arXiv:2604. 24197v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Frontier image generation has moved from artistic synthesis toward synthetic visual evidence.

arXiv AI
4d ago

A Benchmark & Dataset for Detecting AI-Manipulated Visual Evidence in the Court System

arXiv:2609.37783v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Photographic evidence is becoming increasingly vulnerable to forms of alteration and fabrication that existing legal and technical workflows are not...

By Kelly McConvey, Sajad Ebrahimi, Nima Jamali, Jalehsadat Mahdavimoghaddam, Matina Mahdizadeh Sani, Maksym Taranukhin, Wentao Zhang, Jacquelyn Burkell, Yuntian Deng, Karen Eltis, Maura R. Grossman, Vered Shwartz, Ebrahim Bagheri
arXiv AI
Aug 19

COMIC: Reference-Aware Safety Gating for Multimodal Large Language Models

The paper introduces COMIC, a reference‑aware safety gate designed for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). COMIC detects the operation requested by a user, identifies visual targets through OCR and open‑vocabulary proposals, and evaluates safety on explicit operation‑target pairs, using max‑risk aggregation and quality‑aware routing to decide whether to allow or block a request. Experiments on several open‑source MLLMs and jailbreak benchmarks show that COMIC improves robustness while maintaining benign utility and efficiency.

By Md Abdullahil Oaphy, Anhao Xiang, Zongxing Xie, Huayue Gu, Chenyu Wang, Honghui Xu
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 7

AEGIS: A Mechanism-Guided Defense against Visual Synonym Jailbreaks in Text-to-Image Models

Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved high visual fidelity and broad adoption, but remain vulnerable to safety violations when adversaries exploit them to synthesize illicit content. Existing alignment paradigms, from input sanitization to structural feature pruning, are largely organized around unsafe concepts explicitly exposed during filtering, editing, or localization.

arXiv AI
Sep 2

One Prompt Is Enough: Watermark Laundering Through Foundation Image Models

The paper introduces the concept of watermark laundering, where an attacker uses a single reconstruction prompt on public foundation image models to produce a visually faithful output that renders invisible watermarks undecodable. The authors evaluate this failure mode across six OpenAI and Google image editing models, three watermarking schemes, and 1,800 reconstructions, finding that OpenAI models cause the strongest payload disruption while Nano Banana 2 shows vulnerability of DwtDct under high-fidelity reconstruction. Prompt ablation experiments reveal that the disruption is driven by the reconstruction pathway itself rather than any specific removal instruction, highlighting prompt-conditioned reconstruction as a distinct attack interface.

By Jidong Yang, Qi Li, Wei Zong, Yang-Wai Chow, Willy Susilo, Huaike Yu, Chunpeng Wang, Suo Gao
arXiv AI
Sep 24

InGuard: Towards Generalized Inner Guardrail for Safe Text-to-Image Generation

InGuard introduces an inner guardrail for text-to-image generation that operates within the model’s own representations, avoiding external classifiers. It grades prompts using the text encoder’s embeddings, modifies risky embeddings with SAGE to produce safe images, and employs a latent detector to halt generation early. Evaluated on the RevGen Safety Benchmark, InGuard achieves a 97.9–98.8% safety rate across five open-weight models while reducing benign disturbances, model parameters, and denoising steps.

By Zeyu Wang, Xiaodan Li, Zhiwen Li, Yuefeng Chen, Hui Xue