arXiv:2607. 07695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce institutional red-teaming, an evaluation methodology for testing deployment rules in multi-agent AI: hold the agents, objectives, and task state fixed, vary only one rule, and attribute the resulting change in collective behavior to that rule.
arXiv:2608. 10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks.
arXiv:2608. 09828v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly work inside systems that govern how they delegate tasks, move information, execute actions, and use shared resources.
Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools.
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
arXiv:2606. 12918v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hierarchical multi-agent systems (MAS) are rapidly being deployed in high-stakes workflows across domains such as finance and software engineering.
arXiv:2606. 04035v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present a systematic study of domain-dependent safety behavior in open-weight LLMs: 7 standardized experiments across 7 ethical domains, testing 5 models (12B--70B) in 4,200 interactions with dual-judge validation.
arXiv:2606. 20408v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2606. 00448v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set.
arXiv:2608. 01193v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An AI development race creates a multi-agent safety dilemma.
arXiv:2606. 20408v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized.