The paper introduces Suan, a new preference optimization algorithm designed to improve safety alignment in large language models. Suan operates directly at the gradient level, avoiding traditional variational derivations, which yields more interpretable and robust training dynamics. Experiments show that Suan outperforms existing methods, achieving superior safety alignment while maintaining response utility.
By Oleksandr Cherednichenko, Roman Klypa
arXiv:2606. 02530v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values often degrades their general capabilities, termed the alignment tax.
By Hao Li, Jingkun An, Zijun Song, Pengyu Zhu, Rui Li, Hao Wang, Wendi Feng, Yesheng Liu, Lijun Li, Jin-Ge Yao, Lei Sha
arXiv:2604. 17299v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Aligning large language models with human preferences must balance two competing goals: responding helpfully to legitimate requests and reliably refusing harmful ones.
By Tiankai Yang, Yi Nian, Xinyuan Li, Ruiyao Xu, Henry Peng Zou, Kaize Ding, Xiyang Hu, Yan Liu, Yue Zhao
arXiv:2603. 07445v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) often require fine-tuning (FT) to perform well on downstream tasks, but FT can induce safety-alignment drift even when the training dataset contains only benign data.
By Guoli Wang, Haonan Shi, Tu Ouyang, An Wang
Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.
arXiv:2512. 05518v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) play a critical role in the democratization of AI, yet their "open" nature introduces more avenues for malicious actors to misuse them for harmful purposes.
By Jason Vega, Gagandeep Singh
Safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) typically depends on high-quality supervision data, such as safe demonstrations or preference pairs. However, in real-world deployment, emerging safety requirements are often specified as natural-language policies, while corresponding supervision data may be costly, delayed, or unavailable.
arXiv:2606. 07678v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment for large language models relies on preference data, but current pipelines often train on large, redundant datasets.
By Yi Nian, Tiankai Yang, Yudi Zhang, Qi Pan, Zelong Xu, Shenzhe Zhu, Qingqing Luan, Yue Huang, Xiangliang Zhang, Yue Zhao
arXiv:2606. 15396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malicious content generated from large language models (LLMs) could pose severe safety risks and ethical concerns.
By Wenbo Yu, Bohua Wang, Hao Fang, Kuofeng Gao, Jingru Zeng, Xiaochen Yang, Tianyi Zhang, Xiaoxiao Ma, Jiawei Kong, Hao Wu, Bin Chen, Shu-Tao Xia, Min Zhang
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
By Joshua Adrian Cahyono
arXiv:2508.20766v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent researc...
By Harethah Abu Shairah, Hasan Abed Al Kader Hammoud, George Turkiyyah, Bernard Ghanem
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.