arXiv AI
Jun 19
Multi-View Decompilation for LLM-Based Malware Classification
arXiv:2606. 20436v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable.
Large Byte Model: Teaching Language Models About Compiled Code
arXiv:2606. 02834v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysis starts with the raw bytes of an executable program, and tools to "lift" these to higher-level representations, such as assembly, are expensive and subject to error.
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arXiv AI
Jul 21
Is "Knowing It's Malicious Enough?" Evaluating LLMs for Fine-Grained Malware Behavior Auditing
arXiv:2509. 14335v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Automated malware classifiers achieve strong detection performance, but auditing requires more than flagging a sample: analysts must explain malicious behaviors and justify them with code evidence.
arXiv AI
Jul 13
Beyond Embeddings: Interpretable Feature Extraction for Binary Code Similarity
arXiv:2509. 23449v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Binary code similarity detection is a core task in reverse engineering.
arXiv AI
Jul 23
Small, Free, and Effective: Orchestrating Open-Weight Small Language Models to Outperform Single LLM for Malware Analysis
arXiv:2607. 20216v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours.
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 18
ALIBI: Adversarial Legitimacy Injection in Binary Input against LLM Malware Analyzers
The paper introduces ALIBI, a semantic cover story attack that injects a small, non-executed read‑only section into compiled binaries to mislead large language model (LLM) malware analyzers. By embedding a coherent but false security narrative, ALIBI can cause LLMs such as Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT‑5.5 Pro, and Claude Opus 4.7 to downgrade or flip the verdicts of malicious samples. The attack also transfers to ELF binaries, and even a verification‑guided defense prompt only partially mitigates the effect, leaving a significant portion of malicious samples classified as benign.
arXiv AI
Aug 13
Instruction Alignment for Binary Code Representation Learning
arXiv:2608. 11766v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Binary code representation learning is a fundamental problem in software security and reverse engineering.
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 18
Delphi Scanner: efficient and interpretable static malware detection via API sequence modeling
Delphi Scanner is a static malware detection system for Windows PE files that balances efficiency and interpretability. It employs a convolutional neural network to model Windows API sequences and a rule‑based interpretation layer to map APIs to high‑level malicious capabilities. Tested on over 190,000 PE files, it achieves 95.35% accuracy with a 1.53 MB model, and demonstrates robustness against out‑of‑distribution samples and adversarial manipulations.
arXiv AI
Jun 16
MASCOT-Android: A Curated Dataset and Automated Collection Pipeline for Android Malware Source Code Specimens
arXiv:2606. 16072v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Compared with binaries and decompiled code, malware source code more directly reflects the attackers' original intent.
arXiv AI
Sep 10
SCRIPTIOC-BENCH: A Benchmark for Recognizing Actionable Threat Intelligence from Script-Based Malware using LLMs
SCRIPTIOC-BENCH is a benchmark designed to evaluate how well large language models can statically extract indicators of compromise (IOCs) from script-based malware. It contains 634 manually verified JavaScript, PowerShell, and VBScript samples and covers four IOC types—URLs, domains, IP addresses, and filesystem artifacts—while distinguishing between directly exposed and encoded indicators. Experiments show that even the best models achieve only 65.4 F1, and a false‑positive taxonomy is introduced to analyze error patterns, with two mitigations (deterministic string utilities and task‑specific adaptation) improving precision and shifting errors toward sample‑grounded mismatches.
arXiv AI
Sep 11
CS-Guard: Benchmarking LLM Guardrails for Code Generation Security
CS-Guard is a new benchmark that systematically evaluates guardrails for code generation security, covering 1,000 malware-generation prompts, 7 jailbreak attacks, and a novel fictional scenario attack (FSA) for text-to-code generation, as well as 331 code prompts for code-to-code generation. The study empirically tests nine guardrails across seven large language models, finding that many guardrails fail to prevent malicious code generation, with attack success rates reaching about 50% for text-to-code and up to nearly 100% for code-to-code and FSA scenarios. CS-Guard introduces a modular three-layer guardrail taxonomy and releases its benchmark and data to support future research.
arXiv AI
Jul 1
AI-Generated PowerShell Malware: An Experimental Framework and Dataset
arXiv:2606. 30819v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative AI has emerged as a significant cybersecurity threat, with several recent attack campaigns leveraging LLMs to generate code for malicious purposes via scripting languages such as PowerShell.
arXiv AI
Sep 25
Detecting Data Poisoning in Code Generation LLMs via Black-Box, Vulnerability-Oriented Scanning
The paper introduces CodeScan, a black-box, vulnerability-oriented scanning framework designed to detect data poisoning and backdoor attacks in code generation large language models (LLMs). CodeScan operates by analyzing structural similarities across multiple code generations, normalizing them with abstract syntax tree (AST) techniques, and then applying LLM-based vulnerability analysis to identify recurring insecure patterns. Evaluations on 117 models across three architectures and multiple sizes show over 97% detection accuracy with fewer false positives compared to prior methods.