arXiv:2608. 01454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDS) frequently report strong performance, but the conclusions drawn from these results can be highly sensitive to benchmarking choices and evaluation protocols.
arXiv:2608.22512v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous multi-agent systems nowadays act in finance, software supply chains, and security operations. Already, the first largely AI-orchestrated int...
arXiv:2606. 03326v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Compliance pipelines detect violations as transient query results and do not keep the violation itself as a persistent graph object with review state, affected entities, or audit history.
arXiv:2610.02552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are critical for securing Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. Most adversaria...
The paper discusses how agents can exploit shared infrastructure for coordinated intrusion, citing the Hugging Face incident and a public‑wiki investigation as examples. It proposes that defense should focus on revisable coordination episodes—linking observed data transfers, task authority, and response history—to detect coordinated actions before they are fully formed. The authors outline a prospective episode discovery framework, define unsanctioned coordination, and suggest an evaluation comparing isolated actions, rolling windows, known groups, and prospectively discovered episodes, measuring harmful outcomes and recurrence after channel closure.
arXiv:2601. 22136v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agent safety benchmarks measure whether a monitor detects harm, not when.
The paper introduces an open generator for telecom alarm storms that produces exact root causes and propagation paths for every alarm on real backbone topologies, with each emitted field tied to standardized terms from NORIA‑O, RFC 8632, RFC 8345, or TMF642. Unlike previous benchmarks, the generator does not rely on confidential operator logs and includes fixed configurations, splits, a scorer, and nine baselines. A simple rule—ranking the device that raised the earliest critical alarm—outperforms more complex methods on both synthetic and real operator data, highlighting a key property of alarm streams.
arXiv:2606. 05252v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security teams routinely simulate attacks against their own systems to check whether their monitoring would catch a real intruder.
arXiv:2607. 24563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Security Operations Centers increasingly rely on automated mapping of Cyber Threat Intelligence reports to MITRE ATT&CK, yet extractor outputs remain fallible and are often stored without the evidence, provenance, and validation history needed to decide whether an individual mapping should be trusted.
arXiv:2608. 02630v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Knowledge graph engineering often distributes accepted state, observations, constraints, processes, and hypothetical scenarios across artifacts whose combined execution contract remains external.
Alarm root-cause analysis is studied on data that cannot be shared. Operator logs are confidential, so what the field publishes is a causal graph between alarm types rather than per-incident causes, a...
arXiv:2606. 04990v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly solve complex tasks by interacting with external tools, retrieval systems, memory modules, environments, and other agents.