The paper investigates how reasoning affects agreement among language models. It distinguishes reasoning as an intervention from reasoning as an observed behavior, comparing agreement under controlled changes in reasoning effort versus observed reasoning lengths. Across nine models and three classification tasks, enabling reasoning increases agreement on the same individuals, while longer reasoning traces correlate with less consistent predictions across models.
By Mila Gorecki, Moritz Hardt
arXiv:2606. 01462v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch.
By Mingzhong Sun, Teresa Yeo, Armando Solar-Lezama, Tan Zhi-Xuan
The paper investigates whether reasoning representations—explanations for large language model outputs—aid humans in evaluating those outputs. A controlled human study tested six reasoning formats across tasks of varying complexity, measuring structural understanding, error detection, and trust calibration. Results revealed a mismatch: participants favored planning- and decomposition-based representations, yet simpler chain-of-thought traces better supported verification, trust, and interpretability, while preferred formats increased calibration risks.
By Jaewoo Lim, Sungbok Shin, Sanghyun Hong
arXiv:2603. 01437v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning.
By Kyle Cox, Darius Kianersi, Adri\`a Garriga-Alonso
arXiv:2606. 11211v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The ability of large language models (LLMs) to express calibrated uncertainty is important for safe deployment.
By Prakul Sunil Hiremath, Harshit R. Hiremath
arXiv:2608. 13760v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors?
By Jean de Dieu Nyandwi, Leena Mathur, Yonatan Bisk, Robert Hawkins, Graham Neubig
arXiv:2606. 02835v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined.
By Simone Caldarella, Davide Talon, Rahaf Aljundi, Elisa Ricci, Massimiliano Mancini
arXiv:2603. 16728v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy.
By Robert Welch, Emir Konuk, Kevin Smith
Defeasible reasoning is a type of reasoning where inferences are drawn from plausible current evidence, but can be retracted upon the introduction of newer evidence. Although recent studies have exami...
arXiv:2608.30413v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Defeasible reasoning is a type of reasoning where inferences are drawn from plausible current evidence, but can be retracted upon the introduction of n...
By Jayanta Sadhu, Sayem Shahad, Kenneth Marino
When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make haphazard errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that people's behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning uses principled and abstract world models.
arXiv:2608. 14161v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs exhibit social biases that can produce inaccurate and discriminatory inferences, posing risks in high-stakes applications.
By Varsha Ramineni, Hossein A. Rahmani, Jerome Ramos, Karin Sevegnani, Emine Yilmaz