With the rapid adoption of generative AI, synthetic medical images pose growing risks, including diagnostic deception and insurance fraud. Although prior work has explored vision-language model (VLM)-based synthetic image detection, these evaluations typically consider images in isolation.
arXiv:2606. 25375v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: With the rapid adoption of generative AI, synthetic medical images pose growing risks, including diagnostic deception and insurance fraud.
By Ching-Hao Chiu, Hao-Wei Chung, Gelei Xu, Xueyang Li, Pin-Yu Chen, John Kheir, Meysam Ghaffari, Carlos Morato, Ahmed Abbasi, Yiyu Shi
arXiv:2609.26623v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Diffusion-based synthetic data generation offers a promising route for sharing medical imaging data without releasing sensitive patient records. Howeve...
By Mischa Dombrowski, Bernhard Kainz
arXiv:2607. 12354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we challenge the prevailing view that information dependency (including rote memorization) drives training data exposure to image reconstruction attacks.
By Rasmus Torp, Shailen K. Smith, Adam Breuer
Deep Contrastive Unlearning for Language Models (DeepCUT) is a framework that removes information from fine‑tuned language models by directly optimizing their latent space. It addresses the challenge of machine unlearning in black‑box models, which has been largely overlooked by previous work that only mitigated output effects. Experiments on real‑world datasets show that DeepCUT consistently outperforms baseline methods in both effectiveness and efficiency.
By Estrid He, Tabinda Sarwar, Ibrahim Khalil, Xun Yi, Ke Wang
arXiv:2607. 13541v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: To overcome data scarcity and privacy constraints in data collection, it has become standard practice across academia and industry to augment real training data with text-to-image (T2I)-generated synthetic data, a paradigm we term Real-Synthetic Mix-Training (RSMT).
By Na Li, Boyu Kuang, Hongsheng Hu, Liquan Chen, Hyoungshick Kim, Yansong Gao, Anmin Fu
arXiv:2508. 09105v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and its Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation (MRAG) significantly improve the knowledge coverage and contextual understanding of Large Language Models (LLMs) by introducing external knowledge sources.
By Shixuan Sun, Siyuan Liang, Jianjie Huang, Jingzhi Li, Xiaochun Cao
arXiv:2504. 14798v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Machine Unlearning (MUL) has emerged as a key mechanism for privacy protection and content regulation, yet current techniques often fail to guarantee the complete removal of sensitive information.
By Hao Xuan, Xingyu Li
arXiv:2512. 05254v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As concerns around data privacy in machine learning grow, the ability to unlearn, or remove, specific data points from trained models becomes increasingly important.
By Anat Kleiman, Robert Fisher, Ben Deaner, Udi Wieder
arXiv:2607. 08867v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cloud-based deep learning enables large-scale medical image analysis but raises significant privacy concerns when sensitive patient images are outsourced for model development.
By Jason Rojas, Jiajie He, Yash Patel, Yuechun Gu, Zeyun Yu, Keke Chen
arXiv:2607. 04339v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large generative models across text-to-text, text-to-image, and image-to-text modalities have been shown to pose significant privacy risks.
By Dayong Ye, Tainqing Zhu, Kun Gao, Junhao Liu, Yichuan Chen, Shuai Zhou, Hengzhu Liu, Bo Liu, Wanlei Zhou
The paper introduces a certification framework for assessing concept unlearning in text-to-image diffusion models, offering high‑confidence guarantees with bounded error on residual concept leakage. Unlike prior methods that rely solely on attack success rates from automated prompt searches, this approach combines statistical certification with worst‑case analysis along concept‑relevant embedding directions to derive explicit upper bounds on leakage probability. Evaluations across NSFW content, artistic styles, and celebrity identities reveal that certified leakage bounds exceed standard attack success rates by 16.2%, highlighting significant residual risks overlooked by existing protocols.
By Mansi, Luca Marzari, Francesco Leofante