arXiv Machine Learning

Reducing information dependency does not cause training data privacy. Adversarially non-robust features do

arXiv:2607. 12354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we challenge the prevailing view that information dependency (including rote memorization) drives training data exposure to image reconstruction attacks.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 16

When T2I Synthetic Data Backfires: Amplified Privacy Risks in Real-Synthetic Mix Training

arXiv:2607. 13541v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: To overcome data scarcity and privacy constraints in data collection, it has become standard practice across academia and industry to augment real training data with text-to-image (T2I)-generated synthetic data, a paradigm we term Real-Synthetic Mix-Training (RSMT).

By Na Li, Boyu Kuang, Hongsheng Hu, Liquan Chen, Hyoungshick Kim, Yansong Gao, Anmin Fu
arXiv AI
Jun 2

Catch-Only-One: Non-Transferable Examples for Model-Specific Authorization

arXiv:2510. 10982v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent AI regulations increasingly emphasize the need for mechanisms that preserve the utility of data for AI innovation while preventing misuse, particularly by enforcing purpose limitation in downstream AI applications.

By Zihan Wang, Zhiyong Ma, Zhongkui Ma, Shuofeng Liu, Akide Liu, Derui Wang, Minhui Xue, Guangdong Bai
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 9

SoK: Reconstruction Attacks on Synthetic Tabular Data (Insights from Winning the NIST CRC)

arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.

By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock
arXiv Computer Vision
Sep 21

Privacy Leakage on DNNs: A Survey of Model Inversion Attacks and Defenses

The paper "Privacy Leakage on DNNs: A Survey of Model Inversion Attacks and Defenses" provides a comprehensive review of model inversion (MI) attacks that exploit trained deep neural networks to reconstruct private training data. It traces the evolution of MI from early machine‑learning contexts to recent DNN‑based attacks across various modalities and learning tasks, offering a detailed taxonomy and comparative analysis of both attacks and defenses. The authors also present an open‑source toolbox on GitHub to support further research in this area.

By Hao Fang, Yixiang Qiu, Hongyao Yu, Wenbo Yu, Jiawei Kong, Baoli Chong, Bin Chen, Xuan Wang, Shu-Tao Xia, Ke Xu