arXiv:2607. 14285v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict?
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arXiv:2607. 24758v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are capable of recognizing evaluation contexts and altering their behavior to reflect evaluator expectations rather than typical deployment behaviors, a phenomenon known as alignment faking.
arXiv:2509. 05367v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Model safety alignment predominantly operates on a binary assumption that requests are either safe or unsafe.
arXiv:2607. 10455v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight.
arXiv:2607. 07184v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Pre-deployment safety evaluations aim to inform the downstream risks of releasing a new AI model.
Pre-deployment safety evaluations aim to inform the downstream risks of releasing a new AI model. Yet most evaluations provide limited evidence about how often undesired model behavior will occur in deployment: they generally have insufficient coverage, are unrepresentative, and are generally recognizable as tests.
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.