arXiv:2606. 29887v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In real-world applications, guardrails are often expected to identify unsafe user-model interactions according to application-specific safety policies, rather than relying on predefined risk taxonomies.
By Jiacheng Zhang, Haoyu He, Sen Zhang, Shen Wang, Xiaolei Xu, Yuhao Sun, Meng Shen, Feng Liu
RePolicy is a reinforcement learning approach designed to invoke safety policies for language model agents by evaluating entire execution trajectories within context-dependent policy libraries. It generates policy-grounded rationales and safety judgments, and is initialized with the PolicyTraj-20K dataset before fine-tuning via GRPO with verifiable rewards and policy-context perturbation. Experiments on six safety benchmarks demonstrate strong safety-detection performance and robust policy invocation across varying contexts.
By Houcheng Jiang, Boxuan Zhang, Qiyong Zhong, Junfeng Fang, Xiang Wang, Xiangnan He
Safeguarding language model agents requires assessing complete execution trajectories under context-dependent safety policies. Existing policy-aware safeguards mainly rely on prompting or supervised f...
arXiv:2607. 03656v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models are increasingly used to turn natural-language requirements into code.
By Adarsh Vatsa, Sachi Shome, Yingming Zhou, William Eiers
The paper introduces a training‑free approach to detect policy violations in large language models by treating the task as an out‑of‑distribution problem in the model’s activation space. It uses whitening‑inspired techniques to compute policy‑violation scores directly from normalized hidden activations, requiring only the policy text and a few illustrative examples. Experiments on several LLMs and policy benchmarks show the method achieves up to 86.0% F1, outperforming fine‑tuned and LLM‑as‑a‑judge baselines while being computationally lightweight.
By Oren Rachmil, Avishag Shapira, Roy Betser, Omer Hofman, Itay Gershon, Asaf Shabtai, Yuval Elovici, Roman Vainshtein
Safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) typically depends on high-quality supervision data, such as safe demonstrations or preference pairs. However, in real-world deployment, emerging safety requirements are often specified as natural-language policies, while corresponding supervision data may be costly, delayed, or unavailable.
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.
By Pierre Dantas, Lucas Cordeiro, Ehsan Nowroozi, Tihanyi Norbert
arXiv:2606. 05805v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based guardrails typically safeguard agents by evaluating proposed actions or inputs before execution, producing safety signals such as binary allow/deny decisions, risk categories, and/or explanatory rationales about potential policy violations.
By Yuhao Sun, Jiacheng Zhang, Shaanan Cohney, Zhexin Zhang, Feng Liu, Xingliang Yuan
arXiv:2510. 20692v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Access control policies are reliability-critical configuration artifacts in cloud systems, yet administrators frequently struggle to verify that a policy permits exactly what they intend.
By Adarsh Vatsa, Bethel Hall, William Eiers
arXiv:2608. 03137v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents must retain reusable information, control a bounded active context, and recover earlier evidence during long-horizon interaction.
By Xiaolong Sun, Qichao Wang, Hangyu Li, Liang Chen
Granite.Trust Policy Tools introduces a YAML-based Actionable Policy schema that specifies what content a generative AI model can or cannot produce, allowing exception-based governance. It also offers a synthetic data generation pipeline to create policy-aligned training data and a suite of tools for defining and enforcing these policies throughout the AI lifecycle. The tools and example policies are open source, enabling organizations to tailor safety policies to their specific risks and regulatory contexts.
By Nathalie Baracaldo, Nicolas Mello, Kush R. Varshney, Heiko Ludwig, Kate Soule, David Cox
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.