SecureDrive‑FL combines differential privacy (DP‑SGD) with a novel Gradient‑Aware Selective Homomorphic Encryption (GASHE) scheme to protect federated driver‑monitoring models. GASHE encrypts only gradient components that exceed a DP‑calibrated sensitivity threshold, avoiding full‑parameter encryption. In experiments on a ten‑class distracted driver task, SecureDrive‑FL matches DP‑SGD’s poisoning resistance while also defending against Man‑in‑the‑Middle attacks, adding only 8–10% runtime overhead.
The paper investigates how federated learning (FL) updates in vehicular edge networks can reveal client identities through gradient-based attacks on inertial sensor data, using the UCI Human Activity Recognition benchmark as a proxy. Experiments show that an honest-but-curious server can identify clients with near-perfect accuracy from unprotected updates. The authors evaluate lightweight defenses—clipping followed by Gaussian noise and ensemble FL—to mitigate this privacy risk while preserving model utility, reporting differential‑privacy budgets and empirical results across multiple attack classifiers and data partitions.
By Ali Akarma (Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia), Toqeer Ali Syed (Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia), Muhammad Khan (University of the West of England, Bristol, U.K), Qurat-ul-ain Mastoi (University of the West of England, Bristol, U.K), Adeel Ahmad (Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia)
HE‑OFT is a cryptographically secure one‑shot federated fine‑tuning protocol that protects privacy by exchanging only one encrypted contribution and never revealing the trained model. Each client fine‑tunes a low‑rank adapter and a classifier head on a frozen public backbone, keeps the adapter, and uploads an encrypted head displacement that the server combines using multiparty CKKS without decryption. On four text classification tasks and one vision task, HE‑OFT achieves 61–79 % accuracy, retaining 85–96 % of the accuracy of a disclosed model, while a test‑time query takes 443.1–1713.1 s on one core or 56.1–255.1 s on a GPU, with level restoration reducing traffic from 1.6 GiB to 13.5 MiB.
By Halil \.Ibrahim Kanpak, Sinem Sav, Alptekin K\"up\c{c}\"u
arXiv:2412. 12640v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The increasing demand for data privacy, alongside the benefits of aggregating data from networked devices, has catalyzed the emergence of federated learning (FL).
By Rui Zhang, Ka-Ho Chow
arXiv:2509. 10691v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Decentralized federated learning enables collaborative model training without a central server, but shared model updates can still leak sensitive information through inversion, reconstruction, and membership inference attacks.
By Fardin Jalil Piran, Zhiling Chen, Yang Zhang, Qianyu Zhou, Jiong Tang, Farhad Imani
arXiv:2608. 15153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Differentially private federated learning must balance privacy protection against model accuracy and training efficiency.
By Wenjing Wei, Alla Jammine, Farid Nait-Abdesselam
arXiv:2606. 02563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity.
By Farhin Farhad Riya, Olivera Kotevska, Jinyuan Stella Sun
arXiv:2606. 17035v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior research suggests that differential privacy (DP) inherently enhances the robustness of federated learning (FL) against backdoor attacks.
By Xiaolin Li, Ning Wang, Ninghui Li, Wenhai Sun
arXiv:2609.15039v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: User prompts provided to large language models (LLMs) may contain private information. One way to protect them is to execute the LLM inside a...
By Shashie Dilhara Batan Arachchige, Robin Carpentier, Hassan Jameel Asghar, Dali Kaafar
SpliTEE extends the split‑inference architecture of Slalom to large language models by protecting intermediate GPU computations with differential privacy rather than encryption. The authors show that masking intermediate representations is essential, as a prompt‑reconstruction attack can recover prompts with about 80% accuracy. Their global sensitivity analysis bounds the noise needed, and they demonstrate that SpliTEE on Intel TDX achieves near‑double the speed of fully CPU‑based inference and outperforms encryption‑based Slalom while maintaining higher accuracy.
By Shashie Dilhara Batan Arachchige, Robin Carpentier, Hassan Jameel Asghar, Dali Kaafar
Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity. In practice, many HDP-FL systems employ $\varepsilon$-aware server aggregation to improve model utility by re-weighting client updates according to their declared privacy budgets.
arXiv:2609.15885v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: This study proposes a privacy-enhanced federated learning framework to address secure collaborative training in distributed data environments. The fr...
By Zhen Zhong (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., USA), Shini Yang (LinkedIn, CA, USA), Liesheng Wei (Shanghai Ocean University, Shanghai, China)