Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage. These frameworks implicitly assume deterministic behavior, discrete and auditable change events, and clear component-to-owner mappings.
arXiv:2608. 08601v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: To anticipate socio-technical risks from AI agents, organizations need taxonomies to classify them.
By Gabriele La Malfa, Lakmal Meegahapola, Edyta Bogucka, Jie M. Zhang, Michael Luck, Elizabeth Black, Daniele Quercia
arXiv:2410. 22526v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: To effectively address potential harms from Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, it is essential to identify and mitigate system-level hazards.
By Shalaleh Rismani, Roel Dobbe, AJung Moon
arXiv:2607. 23365v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as healthcare, autonomous driving, finance, and education.
By Muhammad Tukur, Hayatullahi B. Adeyemo, Tao Chen, Nour Ali, Anis Zarrad, Rick Kazman, Marco Agus, Rami Bahsoon
arXiv:2608. 07446v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in enterprise settings has introduced operational, security, and governance risks.
By Afreen Alam, Evgenija Popchanovska, Ana Gjorgjevikj, Maryan Rizinski, Lubomir T. Chitkushev, Irena Vodenska, Dimitar Trajanov
arXiv:2608. 10153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprises are deploying autonomous AI agents faster than they can govern them, and prevailing approaches stretch a single discipline, typically DevSecOps built for deterministic automation, across every scale of agency.
By Srinivas Telukunta, Georgios Nektarios Lilis, Lucio Baron
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
By Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley
arXiv:2606. 07119v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The current phase of enterprise AI deployment faces a structural failure: organisations are acquiring agentic capability without the infrastructure to govern it.
By Sergio Alvarez-Telena, Marta Diez-Fernandez
arXiv:2606. 00448v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set.
By Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen, Junxian You, Xiaoyuan Wang, Xiaochong Jiang, Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Jingzhou Xu
arXiv:2606. 14594v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-assisted software development has moved from line-level autocomplete to agents that can plan changes, edit files, and submit pull requests with limited human supervision.
By Jassem Manita, Aziz Amari
arXiv:2608. 04921v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems become increasingly integrated into diverse interfaces and applications, model-centric audits are insufficient to address risks arising from interactions among system components and deployment environments.
By Leah Davis, Dominic Martin, AJung Moon