arXiv:2606. 05844v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Rule-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) offer precise attack detection as well as mitigation, however their manually crafted, signature-driven rules limit adaptability to emerging and zero-day threats.
By Hassan Jalil Hadi, Rehana Yasmin, Ali Shoker
arXiv:2606. 11098v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent deep learning approaches for network intrusion detection increasingly incorporate temporal architectures such as recurrent networks and Transformers, often reporting near-perfect performance on CIC-IDS2017.
By Zach Moczkodan (Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada), Hany Ragab (Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada)
arXiv:2607. 00763v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Digital forensic investigations of network intrusions require analytical outputs that are traceable, reproducible, and court-defensible - requirements existing machine learning pipelines do not satisfy, since they treat original evidence as training data and produce opaque classifications without instance-level justification.
By Jose Luis Vela Alonso, Carmen Pellicer
Recent deep learning approaches for network intrusion detection increasingly incorporate temporal architectures such as recurrent networks and Transformers, often reporting near-perfect performance on CIC-IDS2017. However, many existing studies neither supply their temporal modules with genuine sequence inputs nor evaluate under realistic, leakage-free conditions, making it unclear whether reported gains arise from true sequence-modeling capability.
arXiv:2606. 29797v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Machine learning network intrusion detection systems (IDS) rely on aggregate flow statistics that discard distributional structure, while established entropy measures require raw packet sequences unavailable in pre-aggregated flow datasets.
By Mohamed Aly Bouke, Md Shohel Sayeed, Swee-Huay Heng, Azizol Abdullah, Mohamed Othman
arXiv:2606. 18599v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the primary communication standard for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, but its lack of encryption and authentication exposes it to a range of security threats.
By Qiqi Liu, Runhan Song, Lei Cui, Heng Zhang, Yuyan Sun, Limin Sun
arXiv:2608. 15761v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Edge-IIoTset is the reference benchmark for machine-learning intrusion detection in the industrial Internet of Things, and results reported on it cluster above 99%.
By Mostafa M. Galal
Machine learning network intrusion detection systems (IDS) rely on aggregate flow statistics that discard distributional structure, while established entropy measures require raw packet sequences unavailable in pre-aggregated flow datasets. We propose Multi-Level Distributional Entropy (MDE), an analytical framework that derives interpretable entropy features directly from flow-level summary statistics at three levels: within-flow Gaussian differential entropy, cross-directional Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD), and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flag-pattern Shannon entropy, without raw packet access or training data.
arXiv:2608. 01454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDS) frequently report strong performance, but the conclusions drawn from these results can be highly sensitive to benchmarking choices and evaluation protocols.
By Lorenzo Guerra, Thomas Chapuis, Guillaume Duc, Pavlo Mozharovskyi, Van-Tam Nguyen
arXiv:2606. 28439v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely applied in Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) due to their high accuracy.
By Jinhao You, Zan Zhou, Shujie Yang, Yi Sun, Lei Zhang, Changqiao Xu
arXiv:2607. 13801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are increasingly studied for security monitoring, yet their robustness against feasible traffic manipulation remains largely empirical.
By Zhenpeng Li
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations.